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MORE MEANINGFUL PROTECTION FOR THE RIGHT TO
REFUSE ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS
Bee v. Greaves
744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1985)
NANCY BUNN*
Challenges to the forcible administration of antipsychotic drugs to
unconsenting individuals are creating an increasing amount of litigation
in federal and state courts. Many courts are now recognizing a federal
constitutional right to be free from the forcible administration of antip-
sychotic drugs. Possible sources of this right include the first' and
eighth 2 amendments and the due process clauses of the fifth and four-
teenth amendments. 3
Though the existence of an individual's "right to refuse" antip-
sychotic drugs4 is gaining general acceptance, courts and commentators
continue to disagree as to what standard of review applies when balanc-
ing this right against competing state interests.5 The debate centers
around the amount of deference to afford to the professional judgment of
state psychiatrists who determine that the forcible administration of an-
tipsychotic drugs is warranted. Additionally, the manner in which
courts define this somewhat vague professional judgment standard signif-
icantly affects the scope of an individual's right to refuse. 6
Most of the litigation surrounding the right to refuse involves invol-
untarily committed inmates of state mental institutions. However, the
Tenth Circuit recently considered the issue in pre-trial detainment setting
in Bee v. Greaves.7 The Bee court recognized a fundamental constitu-
tional right to refuse antipsychotic drugs, but noted that the right is not
absolute. The court then proceeded to define the circumstances under
* B.A., History, University of Wisconsin at Madison; candidate for J.D. IIT Chicago-Kent
College of Law, 1987.
1. See infra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
4. This comment will hereinafter refer to an individual's right to refuse antipsychotic drugs
simply as the "right to refuse."
5. See infra notes 56-66 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 102-115 and accompanying text.
7. 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1187 (1985).
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which a state's interest in forcibly medicating a pre-trial detainee would
override the individual's right to refuse.
This comment describes the nature of antipsychotic drugs and their
effects on individuals. The theories and history of right to refuse cases
will then be examined. Next, the Bee court's consideration of pre-trial
detainees' right to refuse antipsychotic drugs is discussed. This comment
then shows that the opinion in Bee gives more meaningful definition to
the previously vague professional judgment standard that courts apply in
right-to-refuse cases. Finally, the comment concludes that the Bee deci-
sion serves to provide more meaningful protection of what has been iden-
tified as a fundamental liberty interest.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The nature and effects of antipsychotic drugs are an important con-
sideration underlying the court's recognition of an individual's right to
refuse these drugs. Antipsychotic drugs8 first appeared in the early
1950's, replacing insulin, shock and lobotomy as the preferred method of
treatment in state mental hospitals. 9 These drugs are frequently pre-
scribed as treatment for certain psychotic conditions including schizo-
phrenic disorders.' 0 The precise manner in which antipsychotic drugs
work on the brain is not known, I" although their recognized therapeutic
effect is to temporarily relieve many of the symptoms associated with
psychotic disorders. 12
Despite the therapeutic effects that antipsychotic drugs may have on
some patients, the potential side effects of these drugs are the major focus
8. Antipsychotic drugs are also referred to as "neuroleptic drugs," and "major tranquilizers."
Among the most frequently used of these drugs are Thorazine, Mallaril, Prolixis, and Halodol. See
Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 653 n. 1 (Ist Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub.
nom., Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982); Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 926-27 (N.D. Ohio
1980).
9. Gelman, Mental Hospital Drugs, Professionalism, and the Constitution, 72 GEO. L.J. 1725,
1726 (1984). Associate Professor Gelman was one of the plaintiff's attorneys of record in Reenie v.
Klein, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc), vacated and remanded, 458 U.S. 1119, on remand, 720
F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983) (en banc); which was one of the seminal cases regarding involuntarily com-
mitted mental patients' right to refuse antipsychotic medication.
10. RECH & MOORE, INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY, 292, 299 (1971); see also
Sitnick, Major Tranquilizers in Prison: Drug Therapy and the Unconsenting Inmate, 11 WILLAM-
ETTE L.J. 378, 382-83 (1975).
11. For a discussion of the possible ways in which psychotropic drugs, of which antipsychotics
are one class, work chemically see Comment, Madness and Medicine: The Forcible Administration of
Psychotropic Drugs, 1980 Wis. L. REV. 497, 498 (psychotropic drugs either increase the level of the
neurotransmitter dopamine in the brain or increase the sensitivity of dopamine receptors); see also
Rhoden, The Right to Refuse Psychotropic Drugs, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 363, 379 (1980).
12. Psychotropic drugs relieve such symptoms associated with psychosis as hallucination, delu-
sions, belligerance, and extreme agitation or withdrawal. RECH & MOORE, supra note 10, at 290;
Sitnick, supra note 10, at 382; see also Gelman, supra note 9 at 1741.
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in the opposition to their widespread use in mental hospitals and pris-
ons.' 3 Some side effects, though temporary, can be very disturbing.' 4
However, the greatest concern over the harmful effects of antipsychotic
centers around a condition known as tardive dyskinesia. The affliction is
painful, disfiguring and sometimes disabling.' 5 It is common among
mental patients, 16 and at present there is no cure. 17
In light of the frightening and dangerous side effects that antip-
sychotic drugs may have, it is not surprising that many mental patients
refuse to take the drugs."' Many patients' refusals of antipsychotics are
met with forcible administration of the drugs, causing them to seek judi-
cial relief, frequently in class action suits for both injunctive relief and
money damages. 19 In response to these suits, some federal courts recog-
nize a federal constitutional right to refuse antipsychotic drugs.
13. See Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d at 843 n.8 ("The risk of serious side effects stemming from
the administration of antipsychotic drugs is a critical factor in our determination that a liberty inter-
est is infringed by forced medication."); see also Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d at 653 n.1; Davis v.
Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. at 928 ("Most disturbing, however, is that all antipsychotic drugs can cause
side effects which are 'as varied and serious as any pharmaceuticals approved for clinical use in the
United States'.") (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
14. Temporary side effects include akathesia, which is a subjective state in which a person
experiences a compelling desire to move about constantly. Sometimes antipsychotics have the oppo-
site effect, resulting in a condition known as akinesia, which suppressed mental and physical sponta-
neity. See, e.g., RECH & MOORE, supra note 10, at 299. Other potential side effects include
parkinsonian type muscle disorders including masked face, tremors, shuffling gait and drooling. See,
e.g., Kline & Angst, Side Effects of Psychotropic Drugs, 5 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 444, 452 (1975).
Still other temporary side effects include dry mouth, sexual dysfunction, blurred vision, constipation
and convulsions, For detailed descriptions of the potential temporary side effects antipsychotic
drugs may have on motor activity and on a person's physical and mental state, see Rennie v. Klein,
653 F.2d at 843-44; Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. at 928-29; Sitnick, supra note 10, at 383-84;
Comment, supra note 11, at 530-32.
15. Tardive dyskinesia is characterized by involuntary muscle movements, especially bizarre
tongue and mouth movements. It may make swallowing, speaking and breathing extremely difficult
and may affect a person's ability to walk and to digest food. See Klawans, Goetz & Perlik, Tardive
Dyskinesia: Review and Update, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 900 (1980); see also Rogers v. Okin, 634
F.2d at 653, n. 1; Gelman, supra note 9 at 1742-43; Comment, supra note 11 at 532-33.
16. Estimates of the rate of occurrence of tardive dyskinesia vary. Compare Comment, supra
note 11 at 533 (tardive dyskinesia affects one half of all chronically hospitalized schizophrenics); with
Gelman, supra note 9, at 1742-43 (estimates vary from 15-20% to as high as 65%). The condition is
now recognized by the American Psychiatric Association as a general health problem of major pro-
portions. Id. at 1742 n.86.
17. Gelman, supra note 9, at 1743; Comment, supra note 11, at 533.
18. A refusal by a psychiatric patient to take his or her medication is not necessarily an irra-
tional one. The theory that psychotic patients do not know what is in their own best interests is
questionable in light of the fact that some patients who have taken antipsychotics and have improved
as a result still refuse drug therapy. Comment, supra note 11 at 499. Many of these patients refuse
to take the drugs because of their adverse side effects. See Van Putten, Why do Schizophrenic Pa-
tients Refuse to Take Their Drugs, 31 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 67, 70-71 (1974).
19. Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836; Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650; Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F.
Supp. 915.
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THE SOURCES OF THE RIGHT To REFUSE ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS
A possible source of the right to refuse antipsychotic drugs is the
first amendment. One court has suggested that the first amendment pro-
tects an individual's ability to think, stating that "[a] person's mental
processes, the communication of ideas and the generation of ideas, come
within the ambit of the First Amendment. To the extent that the First
Amendment protects the dissemination of ideas and expression of
thoughts, it equally must protect the individual's right to generate
ideas."' 20 Accordingly, some plaintiffs argue that because antipsychotic
drugs inhibit their ability to generate ideas, forcible drugging violates the
first amendment guarantee against such intrusions into one's thought
processes. 21 Most courts, however, rejected this argument. 22
Some plaintiffs point to the eighth amendment as a source of the
right to refuse antipsychotic drugs. Involuntarily committed mental pa-
tients have had little success basing their claims on the eighth amend-
ment's guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment because the
Supreme Court has implied that the protections of the eighth amendment
are limited to criminal punishment. 23 Though there are persuasive argu-
ments24 and limited judicial precedent 25 for applying the eighth amend-
20. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, Civil Action No. 73-19434-AW (Wayne
County, Mich., Cir. Ct., July 10, 1973), quoted in Shapiro, Legislating the Control of Behavior Con-
trol: Autonomy and the Coercive Use of Organic Therapies, 47 S. CALIF. L. REV. 237, 258 (1973).
One commentator concedes that this "right to generate ideas" is as yet unrecognized by most courts
but attributes the "newness" of such an application of the first amendment to the relatively new
technologies of mind control. See Comment, supra note 11, at 505. But see Rhoden, supra note 11,
at 389 for criticism of the notion that courts can rely on the first amendment where restraints on
expression are not at issue.
21. Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. at 933. One federal prisoner stated in his petition for writ
of habeas corpus that he had been injected with drugs that "muddle a man's mind preventing him
from writing clearly to courts, politicians, or relatives." See Peek v. Ciccone, 288 F. Supp. 329, 330
(W.D. Mo. 1968).
22. See Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d at 844; see also Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. at 929.
23. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977). Though the court implied that the
Eighth Amendment's application was limited to the prison setting, it also stated:
Some punishments, though not labeled "criminal" by the State, may be sufficiently analo-
gous to criminal punishments in the circumstances in which they are administered to jus-
tify the application of the Eighth amendment .... We have no occasion in this case, for
example to consider whether or under what circumstances persons involuntarily confined
in mental or juvenile institutions can claim the protection of the Eighth Amendment.
Id. at 669 n.37 (citation omitted).
24. See Symonds, Mental Patients Right to Refuse Drugs: Involuntary Medication As Cruel and
Unusual Punishment, 7 HASTINGS CONT. L.Q. 701 (1980). The author argues for the application of
the eighth amendment to institutionalized mental patients even when drugs are used for therapeutic
purposes according to acceptable medical standards. She relies on the judicial trend toward recog-
nizing the arbitrariness of the "treatment vs. punishment" distinction as well as the similarities be-
tween institutionalization of mental patients and criminal confinement.
25. See Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 947 (3d Cir. 1976) (Under certain circumstances, medica-
tion of psychiatric hospital inmate with antipsychotic drugs could raise eighth amendment question);
Souder v. McGuire, 423 F. Supp. 830, 832 (M.D. Pa. 1976) (involuntary administration of drugs
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ment's standards in mental hospital cases, the most recent decisions hold
that the eighth amendment is inapplicable in this setting.26 Unlike invol-
untarily committed mental patients, prisoners who are forcibly adminis-
tered with antipsychotic drugs may have a claim for cruel and unusual
punishment.27
Plaintiffs in right-to-refuse litigation have been most successful
when basing their claims on notions of substantive due process. Most
courts agree that a person's right to refuse antispychotic drugs implicates
a fundamental liberty interest 28 protected by the guarantees of the due
process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 29 Though the
Supreme Court has not specifically ruled on the drug issue, it has held
that where such an interest exists, it is best defined as a liberty interest.
30
The precise nature of such a liberty interest is, however, the subject of
some dispute.
The First Circuit, in Rogers v. Okin identified the right-to-refuse as
"part of the penumbral right to privacy, bodily integrity, or personal se-
curity. ' ' 3' In Davis v. Hubbard,32 the court identified a liberty interest in
"bodily integrity,"'33 "making certain kinds of personal decisions,"'34 and
that have painful or frightening side effects can violate eighth amendment); see also Knecht v. Gill-
man, 488 F.2d 1136, 1139-40 (8th Cir. 1973) (use of drugs that induce violent vomitting when in-
mate violated behavior protocol, if without inmate's consent, violated eighth amendment ban on
cruel and unusual punishment).
26. Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d at 844; see also Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (eighth
amendment not applicable in case of involuntarily committed mentally retarded inmate).
27. See Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974) (use of
Thorazine and Sparine to control behavior of juveniles at correctional institution violated eighth
amendment); but see Veals v. Ciccone, 281 F. Supp. 1017 (W.D. Mo. 1968) (inmate forced to take
medication that gave him "chest pains and other mental defects" did not state a claim for relief
under eighth amendment); Peek v. Ciccone, 288 F. Supp. 329 (W.D. Mo. 1968) (forcible administra-
tion of Thorazine to federal prisoner not cruel and unusual punishment even though prisoner not
certified psychotic and administration of drugs may have been for inmate's refusal to accept work
assignment).
28. The Supreme Court has identified certain "fundamental liberty interests" which are not
textually based in the Constitution but are nonetheless protected by the due process clauses of the
fifth and fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (woman's right to
privacy in deciding whether or not to have a child); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (privacy
right in freedom to make marital and family decisions); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)
(privacy interest in family autonomy); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (liberty interest in
making educational decisions).
29. Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 841 n.6; Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 653; Davis v. Hub-
bard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 929.
30. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 299 n.16.
31. 634 F.2d at 653.
32. 506 F. Supp. 915.
33. Id. at 930-32 (relying on the common law of torts, the specific guarantees underlying the
fourth and eighth amendments, and the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments).
34. Id. at 931-32 (relying on the tort doctrine of informed consent and on Griswold v. Connect-
icut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) and its progeny).
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in "being able to think and communicate freely." 35 Though the exact
source of such a liberty interest is disputed, it is nevertheless generally
agreed that the due process clauses are implicated in right to refuse
cases.36
COMPETING STATE INTERESTS
Regardless of the exact source of the right, courts which recognize
the right of an individual to refuse antipsychotic drugs also agree that
this right is not absolute. Instead, the right of the individual must be
balanced against legitimate governmental interests in forcibly medicating
the individual. 37 A state's interest in forcibly medicating an involuntarily
committed mental patient derives from one of two sources of power: the
parens patriae theory or the state police power.38
Under the parens patriae theory the state asserts that its interest in
treating the mentally ill derives from its power to act as "the general
guardian of all infants, idiots and lunatics. ' 39 Though this interest in
treating incompetents may be legitimate under some circumstances,
mental illness cannot always be equated with incompetence. 40 Even a
state finding of incompetence that accompanies involuntary commitment
does not necessarily mean that that person is incompetent to make treat-
ment decisions for him or herself.41 Therefore, some courts conclude
that unless the state is faced with an emergency situation,42 there should
be a determination that an individual lacks the capacity to make treat-
ment decisions prior to any forcible administration of antipsychotic
35. 506 F. Supp. at 933. Though other courts and commentators have discussed this interest in
terms of a first amendment right, this court declined to do so, stating "[i]t is enough to observe that
'the power to control men's minds' is 'wholly inconsistent' not only with the 'philosophy of the first
amendment but with virtually any concept of liberty.' " Id. (citation omitted).
36. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. at 299, n.15 ("In this Court petitioners appear to concede that
involuntarily committed mental patients have a constitutional interest in freedom from bodily inva-
sion."); Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d at 654 ("None of the parties or amici in this suit contest the
correctness of this general proposition.").
37. Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d at 844-45; Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. at 934.
38. Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d at 845; Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d at 654; Davis v. Hubbard, 506
F. Supp. at 934-35.
39. Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d at 657 (quoting Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257
(1972)).
40. [T]he overwhelming majority of the patients at LSH are quite capable of rationally
deciding whether it is in their best interests to take or to stop taking psychotropic drugs...
Though they may each suffer from emotional disorders, there is no necessary relationship
between mental illness and incompetency which renders them unable to provide informed
consent to medical treatment.
Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. at 935 (citations omitted).
41. See Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d at 657-59 (Massachusetts commitment proceedings alone do
not provide predicate to forcible administration of drugs).
42. The state's power to forcibly administer antipsychotic drugs in an emergency situation is
discussed infra at notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
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drugs43 on the basis of the state's parens patriae power.
Precisely how the determination of a person's capacity to refuse an-
tipsychotic medication should be made is a question of procedural due
process. The procedural due process issue is most significant when the
state wishes to impose a prolonged course of treatment with antip-
sychotic drugs on an unconsenting individual. In Mathews v. Eldridge,44
the Supreme Court adopted a three-part test to guide courts in deciding
the minimum procedural safeguards due before the government may de-
prive an individual of a constitutionally protected interest. In addition to
these minimum federal standards, states may provide procedural protec-
tions that extend beyond the procedures required by the constitution. 45
Therefore, the procedures which state officials must follow in determin-
ing whether a person is incompetent to consent to treatment may vary
from state to state.
In Rennie v. Klein,46 the Third Circuit held that a decision to forci-
bly medicate an individual who has not been declared incompetent to
consent to treatment is valid if certain administrative procedures are fol-
lowed. 47 The First Circuit, however, held in Rogers v. Okin48 that due
process would require both an initial determination of incapacity to con-
sent to treatment and certain procedural guarantees following the deci-
sion to forcibly medicate. 49 Finally, in Davis v. Hubbard,50 the district
43. [T]he sine qua non for the state's use of its parens patriae power as justification for the
forceful administration of mind affecting drugs is a determination that the individual to
whom the drugs are to be administered lacks the capacity to decide for himself whether he
should take the drugs.
Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d at 657 (citation omitted); see also Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. at 936,
n.27 and accompanying text.
44. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). In addressing a procedural due process claim, courts should consider:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the addi-
tional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Id. at 335 (citation omitted).
45. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. at 300.
46. 653 F.2d at 836.
47. Id. at 851. The Third Circuit held that the procedures established in New Jersey's Admin-
istrative Bulletin 78-3 were constitutionally adequate for deciding when to forcibly medicate a per-
son who had not been declared incompetent in a judicial proceeding. Briefly, the scheme established
a three-step, institutional review of a decision to forcibly medicate that included the patient, the
treating physician, the entire "treatment team" and finally the institution's medical director. Ulti-
mately, the medical director could make the decision to forcibly medicate an individual if he or she
agreed with the treating physician's opinion. Id. at 848-49.
48. 643 F.2d 650.
49. Id. at 657. The First Circuit held that the state's exercise of its parens patriae powers to
forcibly medicate an individual must be preceded by a determination that the individual lacks the
capacity to decide for himself whether he should take the drugs. Id. Though the court did not imply
that fullblown competency proceedings were required, Id. at 659, it also stated that commitment
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court, while declining to decide the question, suggested that "some kind
of" prior hearing should take place before forcibly medicating an individ-
ual with antipsychotic drugs.5 Though the standards of procedural due
process may vary, it appears that there must be some procedural protec-
tions before a state can forcibly administer antipsychotic drugs to an in-
voluntarily committed mental patient on the basis of its parens patriae
power.
In contrast to the procedural protections that must accompany a
state's assertion of its parens patrie power, a state's assertion of its inher-
ent police power in an emergency is understandably less limited by pro-
cedural due process requirements. 52 Most courts recognize that the state
has a legitimate interest in protecting a patient from harming himself or
others.53 Thus, it is generally agreed that in an emergency situation,
where a mental patient poses a safety threat, the state may have a legiti-
mate interest in forcibly administering antipsychotic drugs.54 A state's
assertion of its police power should depend, however, in the first instance
upon the existence of an emergency. 55
When addressing a state's emergency powers, courts begin to disa-
gree as to the standard of review to apply to a state's decision to forcibly
medicate. Whereas some courts encourage judicial review of whether or
proceedings alone were not enough. Id. at 658. Furthermore, the Rogers court suggested that fol-
lowing a determination of incompetency to make treatment decisions, there should be periodic re-
view by a non-treating physician of a patient being forcibly medicated. Such review would ensure
that the treating physicians are in fact attempting to make treatment decisions as the patients them-
selves would, were they competent. Id. at 661.
50. 506 F. Supp. 915.
51. Id. at 938. Since none of the parties to the suit had raised the procedural due process issue
the court could not decide the issue but it did offer "certain general observations on the question as a
guide to the parties." Id. The court suggested that a prior hearing would be appropriate in most
situations. It suggested, however that due process would not necessarily require that the impartial
decision maker come from outside the institution. Id. at 939.
52. "While a prior hearing may be required in most circumstances, it certainly is not required
in all. Due process, for instance, has generally not required the State to conduct a prior hearing
when confronted with an emergency." Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. at 939 (Citing Goss v. Lo-
pez, 419 U.S. 565, 582-83 (1975); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944); North American Cold
Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908)).
53. Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d at 654; Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. at 934.
54. Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d at 654; Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. at 934; see also, Osgood v.
District of Columbia, 567 F. Supp. 1026, 1030 (D.D.C. 1983) (emergency situation in prisons may
justify forcible administration of antipsychotic drugs); Gilliam v. Martin, 589 F. Supp. 680, 682
(W.D. Okla. 1984) (same).
55. See Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. at 934:
Given the significant invasion of the fundamental interests that the forced use of psycho-
tropic drugs represents, the risk of danger which the State has a legitimate interest in
protecting against must be sufficiently grave and imminent to permit their coerced use.
The focus must therefore be in the first instance on the existence of danger ... since it is
this which justifies the coercive power of the State.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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not an emergency actually existed at the time a person was forcibly
drugged56 other courts have determined that psychiatrists at state mental
institutions are entitled to complete deference in their determination that
an emergency existed.
57
Furthermore, there has been some disagreement as to how strictly
courts should scrutinize a state's choice to use antipsychotic drugs, as
opposed to some other measures, in an emergency situation. In the past,
the Supreme Court required that the state choose the least intrusive
means possible when infringing on a fundamental constitutional inter-
est.58 The application of the doctrine is "motivated by a recognition of a
duty to afford individuals the full protection of their constitutional rights,
even where the state has convinced the court that some infringement on
those rights is justified."59 Yet courts do not uniformly impose this least
restrictive alternative test where mental patients have claimed the right
to be free from the forcible administration of antipsychotic drugs. 60
The debate over the application of a more or less stringent standard
of review is best illustrated in Rennie v. Klein.61 In that opinion, a major-
ity of the Third Circuit, sitting en banc, held that protection of the
mental patient's liberty interest in being free from forced drugging re-
quired that the state consider the "least intrusive infringement. ' 62 Yet
Circuit Judge Garth, in a lengthy concurring opinion, forcefully rejected
56. See Id. at 934-35 ("[I]t is not enough that the patient has at some time been violent.... As
a constitutional minimum,... the State must have at least probable cause to believe that the patient
is presently violent or self-destructive .. ")
57. See Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d at 654-57. The First Circuit rejected the district court's
ruling that an emergency existed only where there was a "substantial likelihood of physical harm to
the patient, other patients, or to staff members." Id. at 655. Instead, the First Circuit held that the
courts should "leave this difficult, necessarily ad hoc balancing to state physicians. Id. at 657.
58. The Court applied the least restrictive alternative doctrine to protect an individual's right to
privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). It has also applied the doctrine to protect
an individual's first amendment rights in Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). Both of these
interests may be implicated where an individual maintains a right to refuse antipsychotics. See supra
notes 20-22 and 28-36 and accompanying text; see also Comment, The Scope of the Involuntarily
Committed Mental Patient's Right to Refuse Treatment With Psychotropic Drugs: An Analysis of the
Least Restrictive Alternative Doctrine, 28 VILL. L. REV. 101 129-148 (1983) (author argues that the
least restrictive alternative doctrine should apply in this context).
59. Comment, supra note 58, at 131.
60. The court in Davis v. Hubbard declined to decide whether the state must use the least
restrictive alternative upon a finding of an emergency. It stated that a finding of present danger "of
course, does not mean that the patient found dangerous must be drugged or can be drugged exces-
sively. These questions, however, concern the State's obligation to provide the least restrictive treat-
ment and are not considered." 506 F. Supp. at 935 n.24.
61. 653 F.2d 836.
62. Id. at 845. The court in Rennie did not decide the issue based upon the existence of an
emergency but instead applied the standard to a prolonged program of treatment. It recognized that
an emergency situation would possibly "require that more discretion be granted the attending physi-
cian." Id. at 847.
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the least restrictive alternative standard 63 and predicted that the Supreme
Court would do the same.64
Rennie went to the Supreme Court where the judgment was vacated
and remanded for consideration in light of its decision in Youngberg v.
Romeo.65 The Third Circuit interpreted the remand instructions to mean
that the Supreme Court declined to adopt the least restrictive alternative
test. The Rennie court therefore abandoned the stricter standard of re-
view in favor of that standard of review enunciated in Youngberg. Ap-
plying the Youngberg standard, the Third Circuit held that a state
official's decision to forcibly administer antipsychotic drugs does not vio-
late an individual's right to refuse unless "the decision by the profes-
sional is such a substantial departure from accepted professional
judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person re-
sponsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment. ' 66 The
Rennie court therefore adopted a standard of review that defers almost
completely to professional judgment by defining professional judgment as
any decision that does not deviate substantially from accepted norms.
Since the Rennie decision, two other cases involving the right to re-
fuse antipsychotic drugs have been decided. In Osgood v. District of Co-
lumbia,67 the court held that a convicted prisoner's complaint that she
was forcibly drugged with an antipsychotic drug stated legally sufficient
claims under the due process clause of the fifth amendment and the free
exercise clause of the first amendment.68 In its decision, the court stated
that an emergency situation would justify forced drugging with
antipsychotics "only where there is no reasonable alternative action that
is less intrusive."' 69 Although the court initially invoked this strict stan-
63. "[I]n my opinion, any attempt to construct a 'least restrictive' constitutional standard in an
area where medical judgment should control is unsound, unworkable and unwarranted." 653 F.2d
at 861 (Garth, J., concurring).
64. "Logic would indicate that the likelihood of the survival of "least restrictive" as a constitu-
tional standard is slight indeed." Id. at 863.
65. Rennie v. Klein, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982). In Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982), the
Supreme Court considered the substantive rights of involuntarily committed mentally retarded per-
sons. The Court agreed with the Third Circuit that such individuals retain liberty interests in free-
dom from bodily restraint and in personal security but held that the standard of review of state
action under the circumstances was somewhat lower than the "compelling" or "substantial" neces-
sity tests. Id. at 321-22.
66. Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266, 268 (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323).
67. 567 F. Supp. 1026 (D.D.C. 1983).
68. Id. at 1033. Ms. Osgood's claim under the free exercise clause arose out of the fact that, as
a Christian Scientist, the administration of the drugs violated her religious beliefs.
69. Id. at 1031. It is interesting to note that the court's decision to apply the least restrictive
alternative test was made despite its awareness that the Supreme Court had remanded Rennie for
consideration in light of Youngberg v. Romeo. The court stated, "Youngberg did not cast doubt
upon any of the reasoning of Rennie referred to in this Memorandum Opinion, as that case does not
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dard of review, it later tempered its decision with the admonition that,
"in resolving these issues [the existence of an emergency and the availa-
bility of less restrictive alternatives], some deference must be afforded to
the findings of the professionals, involved."' 70
In Gilliam v. Martin,71 the district court dismissed a petitioner's pe-
tition for writ of habeas corpus where the prisoner claimed that he was
being forced to take antipsychotic drugs in violation of his due process
rights and his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. 72 In
so doing, the court not only declined to impose a least restrictive alterna-
tive test, but stated that, in an emergency, prison officials have a duty to
protect correctional officers and inmates from violent prisoners using
"whatever measures are appropriate. '73 Thus, it appears that a signifi-
cant controversy over the applicable standard of review in right to refuse
cases existed prior to the Tenth Circuit's decision in Bee v. Greaves.74
FACTS OF THE CASE
Daniel Bee was a pre-trial detainee in Salt Lake County jail who
requested the antipsychotic drug Thorazine six days after his booking.
Bee had been hallucinating and had threatened to kill himself if he did
not receive the drug. 75 The jail placed Bee in isolation and had him eval-
uated by the jail psychiatrist who prescribed Thorazine.76
Bee was then transferred to the Utah State hospital for an evaluation
of his competency to stand trial. During that time he was diagnosed
schizophrenic by a state psychiatrist and was once again prescribed
Thorazine.77 Approximately one month later, Bee was returned to the
jail, having been certified competent to stand trial.78 The judge at the
competency hearing ordered Bee medicated with Thorazine daily. 79
Following a month of voluntary medication, Bee began to complain
discuss the right to refuse treatment." Id. at 1031-32 n.1. See supra note 65 for a discussion of
Youngberg.
70. 567 F. Supp. at 1036.
71. 589 F. Supp. 680 (W.D. Okla. 1984).
72. Id. at 681. Though the petitioner originally filed a writ of habeas corpus, the court con-
strued his pro se pleading as a request for damages. Id.
73. Id. at 682.
74. 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1187 (1985).
75. Id. at 1389.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. The psychiatrist wrote a letter to the court stating that Bee was "competent to stand trial at
this time in that he has the ability to comprehend the nature of the charges against him and the
punishment specified for the offense charged and has the ability to assist his counsel in his defense."
Id.
79. Id.
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that he was having trouble with the drug. He refused treatment with
Thorazine for five days until the jail psychiatrist ordered him forcibly
medicated whenever he refused to take it orally. Following one instance
of forcible intramuscular injection of Thorazine, Bee took the medication
orally under the continued threat of another forcible injection.80
Bee then filed an action for damages against several employees of the
Salt Lake County Jail under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.81 He alleged that the
administration of Thorazine against his will violated his rights under the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The district court
granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment.8 2 The Tenth
Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that there were disputed factual
issues precluding summary judgment.8 3
THE COURT'S REASONING
The court noted at the outset that pre-trial detainees retain certain
constitutional rights.8 4 The court then recognized that a pre-trial de-
tainee has a liberty interest in freedom from forcible administration of
antipsychotics founded in the right to privacy,85 the right to be free from
bodily restraint, 6 and the right to be free from "unjustified intrusions on
personal security."'8 7 In addition, the court agreed with Bee that the for-
cible administration of antipsychotic drugs raised first amendment con-
80. Id. at 1389-90.
81. Id. at 1389. Bee named as defendants the sheriff, the jail's director of security, the supervi-
sor of the jail, the jail physician, a psychiatrist employed by Salt Lake County Mental Health and
several county commissioners.
82. Id. at 1389.
83. Id. at 1395.
84. Id. at 1391. The Bee court relied on Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979); where the
Supreme Court, after recognizing that prisoners retain certain constitutional rights, stated, "[a]forti-
ori, pre-trial detainees, who have not been convicted of any crimes, retain at least those constitu-
tional rights that we have held are enjoyed by convicted prisoners." 441 U.S. at 545.
85. 744 F.2d at 1392. The court recognized this as a "fundamental personal right" derived
from "the teachings of history (and] solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our society."
Id. (citations omitted). The Bee court relied on the analysis of Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915,
where that court recognized the basis of this fundamental right in the tort doctrine of informed
consent. 744 F.2d at 1392. The court found additional support for the recognition of a privacy right
in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) where a unanimous Supreme Court noted a privacy interest
in "independence in making certain kinds of important decisions." 429 U.S. at 599-600.
86. 744 F.2d at 1393. The court derived this possible basis for a liberty interest from
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982). The Bee court reasoned, "If incarcerated individuals
retain a liberty interest in freedom from bodily restraints of the kind in Romeo then a fortiori they
have a liberty interest in freedom from physical and mental restraint of the kind potentially imposed
by antipsychotic drugs." Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
87. 744 F.2d at 1393 (citing Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980)). The court stated that Vitek
was most relevant to the case in that it involved the treatment of an allegedly unstable prisoner. In
Vitek, the Supreme Court held that a prisoner could not be involuntarily transferred to a mental
hospital without due process protections, including notice, a hearing and an independent decision
maker.
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cerns.88 Having recognized the existence of a fundamental liberty
interest, the court proceeded to balance that interest against competing
state concerns.
Prior to balancing the interests however, the Bee court noted the
admonitions of the Supreme Court that prison administrators be ac-
corded wide-ranging deference in maintaining prison order and that "[i]n
the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the offi-
cials have exaggerated their response to these considerations, courts
should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such matters. '8 9 The
court then proceeded to examine the state's asserted interests in light of
these admonitions. 90
Initially, the court held that the state's asserted duties to treat a
mentally ill detainee and to maintain him in a competent condition to
stand trial were not legitimate state concerns. 91 Next, the court held that
though jail safety and security are legitimate state concerns, the forcible
administration of antipsychotic drugs was not reasonably related to the
goal of jail safety absent an emergency. 92 The court also held that if no
emergency existed, state law would prohibit the forcible administration
of antipsychotic drugs unless there had been a judicial determination of
incompetence to consent to treatment. 93
The court then stated that whether emergency warrants the noncon-
sensual use of antipsychotics will depend on a "professional judgment-
call" by the appropriate medical authorities applying accepted medical
88. 744 F.2d at 1394. The court stated, "The First Amendment protects the communication of
ideas, which itself implies protection of the capacity to produce ideas.... Antipsychotic drugs have
the capacity to severely and even permanently affect an individual's ability to think and communi-
cate." Id. at 1394-95 (citations omitted). The court also pointed to a passage in Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557 (1969) to support its holding that the First Amendment applied in this case:
In a society whose 'whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving govern-
ment the power to control men's minds,' the governing institutions, and especially the
courts, must not only reject direct attempts to exercise forbidden domination over mental
processes; they must strictly examine as well oblique intrusions likely to produce, or
designed to produce, the same result.
744 F.2d at 1394 (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969)).
89. Id. at 1394 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 547-48 (emphasis in original)).
90. 744 F.2d at 1394.
91. Id. at 1395. Regarding the state's constitutional duty to treat the medical needs of pre-trial
detainees, the Bee court stated, "This constitutional requirement cannot be turned on its head to
mean that if a competent individual chooses not to undertake the risks or pains of a potentially
dangerous treatment, the jail may force him to accept it." Id. As to the state's asserted interest in
keeping Bee competent to stand trial the court said, "The needs of the individual, not the require-
ments of the prosecutor, must be paramount where the use of antipsychotic drugs is concerned." Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. The court pointed out that under Utah law, a mentally ill person could not be subjected
to involuntary mental treatment absent a judicial determination that he was incompetent to consent
to treatment. See supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text for differing state views of the proce-
dures required before a person may be treated without his consent.
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standards. 94 "It requires an evaluation in each case of all the relevant
circumstances, including the nature and gravity of the safety threat, the
characteristics of the individual involved, and the likely effects of particu-
lar drugs."' 95 The court further stated that once an emergency has been
determined to exist, the state should consider less restrictive alternatives
before resorting to the forcible administration of antipsychotic drugs.
96
The Bee court expressly recognized the Supreme Court's rejection of the
least restrictive alternative analysis in Youngberg,97 but distinguished
that case "both because it involved temporary physical restraints rather
than mental restraints with potentially long term effects. . . and because
Romeo had been certified as severely retarded and unable to care for
himself." 98
The court concluded that since the record revealed a disputed fact
issue as to whether or not an emergency existed, 99 the district court had
erred in granting summary judgment for the respondents. Furthermore,
the court stated that, even if it were found that an emergency did exist,
"there was a material issue of fact as to whether forcible medication for
an indefinite period was an 'exaggerated response" in this case.'1°° The
case was therefore remanded to the district court for further
consideration. 101
ANALYSIS
Currently, there is little debate that the right to refuse antipsychotic
drugs is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the due process
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Instead, the controversy
surrounds the issue of what standard of review to apply in these cases.
Courts disagree as to the amount of deference to afford state psychiatrists
who, in the exercise of their professional judgment, determine that an
emergency warrants overriding an individual's right to refuse antip-
sychotic drugs.
Much of the controversy surrounding the various possible standards
94. Id. at 1395-96.
95. Id. at 1396.
96. Id. Thus, the court stated that segregation of the prisoner or the use of less controversial
drugs like tranquilizers or sedatives "should be ruled out before resorting to antipsychotic drugs."
Id.
97. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
98. 744 F.2d at 1396 n.7.
99. Id. at 1396. Though the jail psychiatrist had testified that Bee had become assaultive at the
time of the forcible injection, the jail medic who administered the Thorazine testified that Bee was
not acting unusually and was not out of control. Id. at 1389 n.l.
100. Id. at 1396-97. (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
101. Id. at 1397.
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of review actually centers around the meaning of the term "professional
judgment." A court cannot defer to or scrutinize professional judgment
unless it first defines what it means by that term. Courts must therefore
seek to "give an operative meaning to this somewhat amorphous 'profes-
sional judgment' standard."10 2 This is precisely what the decision in Bee
accomplished. In its opinion, the Bee court fashioned a more concrete
definition of the otherwise vague professional judgment standard and in
doing so, provided more meaningful protection to individuals asserting
the right to be free from the forcible administration of antipsychotic
drugs.
In the second Rennie decision, 10 3 the Third Circuit adopted the defi-
nition of the professional judgment standard enunciated by the Supreme
Court in Youngberg v. Romeo.'°4 According to Youngberg, professional
judgment is loosely defined as any decision by a professional' 0 5 that is not
a "substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice,
or standards."'' 0 6 When professional judgment is defined in such a broad
manner, it reduces the right to refuse antipsychotic drugs to no more
than a right to receive professional medical treatment. 107 As such, this
view of what constitutes professional judgment has been understandably
criticized. 0 8 The standard creates a presumption that the decision to
forcibly administer antipsychotics is valid,'0 9 and effectively bars judicial
review of the decision unless the plaintiff can meet the heavy burden of
rebutting the presumption by proving a "substantial departure" from ac-
cepted practices.
102. Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d at 271 (Adams, J., concurring).
103. 720 F.2d 266.
104. See supra, notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
105. In Youngberg the Court defined a "professional" decisionmaker as "a person competent,
whether by education, training or experience, to make the particular decision at issue." 457 U.S. at
323 n.30. The court further stated that long-term decisions should be made by persons with degrees
in medicine or nursing, whereas day-to-day decisions would necessarily be made in many instances
by employees without formal training. Id. If this were in fact the standard that the Supreme Court
would apply in right to refuse cases, the Court would in effect be allowing non-medical personnel to
make a decision to administer antipsychotic drugs.
106. Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d at 269 (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. at 323).
107. See Gelman, supra note 10 at 1732. The author states that when such a standard is used, "a
substantive constitutional liberty right becomes no more than an entitlement to professional judg-
ment concerning one's biological or medical well-being; and the constitutional guarantee of due
process is deemed satisfied by whatever medical judgment happens to be recognized in the psychiat-
ric science of the day." Id.
108. See Rennie, 720 F.2d at 271 (Adams, J., concurring) "A constitutional standard which
provided no protection beyond that of the tort of medical malpractice would be inappropriate for the
involuntarily institutionalized mentally ill."); see also id. at 276 (Weis, J., concurring) ("I fear that
the latitude the majority allows in 'professional judgment' jeopardizes adequate protection of a pa-
tient's constitutional rights.")
109. Id. at 269.
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Initially, the Bee court appears to accept this broad definition of
what constitutes professional judgment when it explains that the determi-
nation of whether an emergency exists "must be the product of profes-
sional judgment by appropriate medical authorities, applying accepted
medical standards." 0 The Bee court, however, does not end its analysis
at this point but instead goes on to say that the determination of whether
an emergency exists requires professional judgment which includes:
a balancing of the jail's concerns for the safety of its occupants against
a detainee's interest in freedom from unwarranted antipsychotics....
It requires an evaluation in each case of all the relevant circumstances,
including the nature and gravity of the safety threat, the characteristics
of the individual involved, and the likely effects of particular drugs. I 11
The court further held that once an emergency has been determined to
exist, the decision-maker must rule out the existence of less restrictive
alternative before resorting to antipsychotic drugs.' 12 Thus, in each in-
stance where the state claims that an emergency warrants the forcible
administration of antipsychotics, a medical professional must not only
weigh the factors outlined above, but must also consider whether isola-
tion of the individual or the use of less controversial tranquilizers would
satisfy the state's interest in the safety of the jail.' 3
In effect, this more detailed definition of what constitutes an exercise
of professional judgment merely allows a court to determine whether a
state psychiatrist's decision to forcibly medicate an individual was, in
fact, a substantial departure from accepted medical practices. Presuma-
bly, a state psychiatrist exercising professional judgment would not forci-
bly medicate an individual unless that psychiatrist first considered the
extent of the danger posed by the individual, the characteristics of that
individual, including any past history of psychotic disorders, the likely
effects that antipsychotics will have, and the availability of less intrusive
means of treatment. In reality, however, state psychiatrists frequently
prescribe antipsychotic drugs for reasons wholly unrelated to an individ-
ual's medical needs."14 The definition of professional judgment set out in
110. 744 F.2d at 1396. In so stating, the court cites to Youngberg and Rennie, where the "sub-
stantial departure" standard for professional judgment was used.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 926, where the court noted that the trial testimony
"established that the prevalent use of psychotropic drugs is countertherapeutic and can be justified
only for reasons other than treatment-namely, for the convenience of the staff and for punish-
ment." Id. (footnote omitted); see also, Bomstein, The Forcible Administration of Drugs to Prisoners
and Mental Patients, 9 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 379, 387-88 (1975) (author argues that there are only
three rationales for medication: treatment, control, or punishment, and that it is necessary to
"pierce the veil" of treatment to disclose the true purpose of control or punishment); Sitnick, supra
MORE MEANINGFUL PROTECTION
Bee merely ensures that the legitimate medical needs of the individual
underly a decision to forcibly medicate, and not other arguably profes-
sional considerations such as administrative convenience.11 5
The manner in which the Bee court defines professional judgment
also redefines the burden of proof in right-to-refuse cases. Instead of
placing on the plaintiff the considerable burden of demonstrating "sub-
stantial departure" from accepted norms, the Bee court places the burden
on state psychiatrists to demonstrate that they in fact exercised profes-
sional judgment when deciding to forcibly medicate. Because the court
required the defendants in Bee to demonstrate that their decision was the
result of professional judgment, Bee's cause of action was able to survive
the government's motion for summary judgment. Had Bee been required
to show that a substantial issue of fact existed as to whether the decision
to medicate him was a substantial departure from accepted practice,
more than likely the Tenth Circuit would have affirmed the district
court's grant of summary judgment for the defendants. In that situation,
all that the state would need in support of its motion would be affadavits
from other state psychiatrists that the forcible administration of an-
tipsychotic drugs is standard practice in jails. When the right to refuse
antipsychotics is measured by current psychiatric practices, that right
becomes meaningless as long as state psychiatrists view the forcible ad-
ministration of the drugs as acceptable.
Courts should consider more precise definitions of the professional
judgment standard such as the one set out in Bee in all cases where indi-
viduals claim that they have been forcibly medicated with antipsychotic
drugs. Courts should, however, be especially precise in defining what
constitutes an exercise of professional judgment in the pre-trial detain-
ment setting. The purpose behind a pre-trial detainee's incarceration is
to ensure that person's presence at trial. 116 Unlike an involuntarily com-
mitted mental patient, there is no basis for presuming that a pre-trial
detainee is mentally ill and in need of any kind of psychiatric treatment.
A more precise definition of what constitutes professional judgment in
forcibly medicating is therefore justified in the prison environment. One
commentator explains that prison psychiatrists are, "first and foremost
note 10 at 386 ("language of treatment may simply provide a rhetorical justification for unlimited
social control of individuals who are perceived to be dangerous"); Opton, Psychiatric Violence
Against Prisoners.- When Therapy is Punishment, 45 Miss. L.J. 605, 640 (1974) (purpose of most
drugging is to keep prisoners quiet and docile).
115. See Rennie, 720 F.2d at 276 (Weis, J., concurring) ("A 'professional judgment' based pri-
marily on administrative convenience or the purely economic interest of the state does not pass
muster.").
116. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 534 n.15 (1978).
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functionaries in the disciplinary power structure of the prison bureau-
cracy."1 17 It is therefore necessary for courts to ensure that the decision
to forcibly medicate a pre-trial detainee with antipsychotic drugs is the
result of an exercise of professional judgment that takes into account the
legitimate medical needs of the individual, the nature of the threat, the
effect the drugs will have and any less intrusive means of handling the
safety threat.
It is too soon to predict the impact that the Bee decision will have in
right to refuse cases. To date, the only practical result of the decision is
that it enables a pre-trial detainee to overcome a motion for summary
judgment by making the existence of an emergency and the availability of
less restrictive alternatives factual issues that preclude summary judg-
ment. At least one court that addressed the issue of a pre-trial detainee's
right to refuse antipsychotic drugs since Bee relied on the Bee court's
analysis in denying the defendants' motion for summary judgment. 118
That court stated that summary judgment was inappropriate since, inter
alia, the existence of an emergency at the time of the forced drugging was
a disputed factual issue and the defendants had introduced no evidence
regarding, "(1) a past record of manic, schizophrenic or other psychiatric
condition indicating a risk to jail safety and security, or (2) the inade-
quacy of segregation, alternative drugs or other less restrictive alterna-
tives .... " 119
By enabling plaintiffs to get their constitutional claims to the finder
of fact, the Bee court's refinement of the professional judgment standard
clearly provides more meaningful protection for the right to refuse antip-
sychotic drugs. It is, however, as yet unclear whether the Bee standard
will provide the same increased protection at trial. It is not unrealistic to
assume that the trial of many right to refuse cases would consist of the
word of the plaintiff against the word of a myriad of state professional
employees. Though it is to the plaintiff's distinct advantage not to have
to prove that the forced medication was a "substantial departure" from
accepted norms, it is also unlikely that the plaintiff will be able to gather
sufficient evidence to rebut the state's evidence that professional judg-
ment, even in the manner required by Bee, was in fact exercised.
117. Opton, supra note 115 at 622; see also, Sitnick, supra note 10 at 388 ("Good medical facili-
ties and fulltime psychiatrists are generally unavailable. Psychiatric decisions are necessarily made
on the basis of information provided by a prison staff that is woefully inadequate.").
118. Hall v. Spraggins, No. 84 C 4098, slip op. (N.D. Ill. July 23, 1985).
119. Id. at 8.
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CONCLUSION
The existence of an individual's right to refuse the forcible adminis-
tration of antipsychotic drugs is gradually gaining general acceptance in
the courts. Most courts identify the right to refuse as a fundamental
liberty interest guaranteed by the due process clauses of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments. Though courts are willing to recognize the
existence of the right, they are not always willing to employ a standard of
review that will closely scrutinize a state's decision to override an indi-
vidual's right to refuse.
Oftentimes, courts employ a standard of review that defers com-
pletely to the professional judgment of state psychiatrists, while at the
same time defining "professional judgment" as any decision by a profes-
sional that is not a substantial departure from generally accepted norms.
In Bee v. Greaves, the Tenth Circuit set out a refined definition of the
term "professional judgment" that serves to provide more meaningful
protection of the right to refuse antipsychotic drugs. However, the true
extent of the protection that Bee will provide remains to be seen.
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